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Exploring the Consequences of Biculturalism:
Cognitive Complexity
Verónica Benet-Martínez, University of California at Riverside, USA,
veronbm@mail.ucr.edu
Fiona Lee, University of Michigan, USA
To explore the possible socio-cognitive consequences of biculturalism, we examined the
complexity of cultural representations in monocultural and bicultural individuals. Study 1
found that Chinese-American biculturals’ free descriptions of both American and Chinese
cultures were higher in cognitive complexity than that of Anglo-American monoculturals,
but the same effect was not apparent in descriptions of culturally-neutral entities
(landscapes). Using the same procedures, Study 2 found that the cultural representations of
biculturals with low levels of Bicultural Identity Integration (BII; or biculturals with
conflicted cultural identities) were more cognitively complex than that of biculturals with
high BII (biculturals with compatible cultural identities). This work shows that biculturalism
and BII have meaningful cognitive consequences; further it suggests that exposure to more
than one culture increases individuals’ ability to detect, process, and organize everyday
cultural meaning, highlighting the potential benefits of multiculturalism.

In today’s increasingly diverse and mobile world, growing numbers of individuals have
internalized more than one culture and can be described as bicultural or multicultural. For
example, one out of every four individuals in the U.S. has lived in another country before
moving to the U.S. and has been exposed to and is familiar with more than one culture (U.S.
Census, 2002). Further, there is a large number of U.S.-born ethnic and cultural minorities (e.g.,
second and third generation descendants of immigrants) for whom identification and
involvement with their ethnic cultures, in addition to mainstream U.S. culture, is the norm
(Phinney, 1996). The prevalence and importance of multiculturalism and biculturalism has been
acknowledged by a number of psychologists (e.g., Fowers & Richardson, 1996; Hermans &
Kempen, 1998; LaFromboise, Coleman, & Gerton, 1993), but the phenomenon has rarely been
investigated empirically. John Berry, who conducted some of the early seminal work on this
topic (see Berry & Sam, 1996, for a review), identified biculturalism as one of four possible
outcomes of the acculturation experience. Recent studies have further shown that identification
with ethnic and dominant cultures are largely orthogonal (particularly among second and older
generation groups) such that individuals can identify highly with both cultures (Ryder, Allen, &
Paulhus, 2000).
Biculturalism and Cultural Frame Switching: Cognitive Consequences
Benet-Martínez and her collaborators have empirically examined the dynamics of
biculturalism; specifically, the socio-cognitive processes involved in the development and
maintenance of a bicultural identity (Benet-Martínez & Haritatos, 2005; Benet-Martínez, Leu,
Lee & Morris, 2002; Hong, Benet-Martínez, Chiu, & Morris, 2003; Hong, Morris, Chiu, &
Benet-Martínez, 2000). For instance, Hong et al. (2000) provided the first empirical
demonstration of cultural frame-switching (CFS), a process in which biculturals have access to
and apply two different cultural meaning systems in response to cultural cues. Specifically,
Hong and her colleagues showed that Chinese-American biculturals make more internal
attributions, a characteristically Western attribution style (Morris & Peng, 1994), after being
primed with American cues, but make more external attributions, a characteristically East Asian
attribution style, after being primed with Chinese cues. Biculturals’ CFS behavior has been
replicated in other behavioral domains and cultural groups (e.g., Gardner, Gabriel, & Dean,
2004; Verkuyten & Pouliasi, 2002; Wong & Hong, 2005).
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The process of CFS involves the application of different cultural interpretative frames or
cultural meaning systems to the processing of and reaction to everyday social situations. The
application of one or another frame is guided by the cultural cues that precede or define the
particular social context in which the bicultural finds him or herself. These cues may be blatant
cultural symbols (e.g., flags, language, attire) or much more subtle and implicit features of the
situation (e.g., roles, expectations, and goals embedded in a particular context). Given the
increasing pervasiveness of cultural cues and complexity of cultural systems in today’s world
(Hermans & Kempen, 1998), one may wonder what cognitive consequences, if any, the
repeated experience of CFS may have for biculturals. More specifically, are biculturals, by
virtue of their frequent engagement in CFS (i.e., the cognitive-behavioral tasks of detecting,
processing, and reacting differently to various cultural cues in the environment) cognitively
different from individuals for whom CFS is not a common experience?
In line with the socio-cognitive literature on expertise (e.g., Feltovich, Ford, & Hoffman,
1997), multi-tasking (e.g., Rubinstein, Meyer, & Evans, 2001), and self-relevant knowledge
(e.g., Nowak, Vallacher, Tesser, & Borkowski, 2000), we propose in the present chapter that
biculturals, because of their frequent CFS experiences, think about culture in more complex
ways than monoculturals or individuals who have internalized only one culture. That is, we
argue that cultural representations (ethnic and mainstream) held by biculturals embody more
components and more relations among these components. Before elaborating on our hypothesis
regarding the relationship between biculturalism and complexity of cultural schemas, we briefly
define the constructs of cognitive complexity and cultural representation.
Cognitive complexity is a broad individual difference variable that measures the degree
of differentiation, articulation, and abstraction within a cognitive system (see Burleson &
Caplan, 1998, for a review). Put more simply, cognitive complexity is the capacity to construe
people, objects, and ideas in a multidimensional way (Suedfeld, Tetlock, & Streufert, 1992).
Cognitive complexity is related to both content (properties and features) and underlying
structure (relationships and dynamics). Higher level of cognitive complexity is indicated by
greater information clustering (more differentiation and integration) and abstractness (less
concrete and episodic descriptions). Cognitive complexity has been examined in interpersonal
(Burleson & Samter, 1990), political (Tetlock, 1983), and affective reasoning domains
(Suedfeld & Pennebaker, 1997), and found to be related to a wide range of outcomes (e.g.,
adjustment, persuasion). In this chapter we focus on the complexity of cultural representations,
or shared meaning regarding the essence and dynamics of a particular culture that is socially
created through language, images, and practices (Hall, 1997). Psychologically, at the individual
level, these cultural representations include the particular values, beliefs, practices, images, and
artifacts an individual associates to a specific culture.
CFS and Cognitive Complexity: Expertise and Control Processes. We propose that biculturals’
more complex cultural representations are the result of accumulated experience at detecting and
processing complex, ambiguous, and fast changing cultural cues. According to the literature on
expertise (Feltovich et al., 1997), repeated exposure to and practice in a particular domain leads
to domain-relevant schemas that are more complex. Similarly, biculturals’ repeated CFS
experiences should lead to cultural schemas that are more organized, abstract,
multidimensional, and integrated. Through constant CFS, biculturals are further cognizant that
cultural norms vary and change depending on the context. In other words, CFS creates a
perspective that grasps the relativism and multidimensionality of each cultural system
(Fontaine, 1990; Gutierrez & Sameroff, 1990), leading to more complex representations of both
cultures (e.g., ethnic and mainstream). Note that we are not implying that monoculturals are
culturally naive; most of these individuals identify with their culture and are familiar with the
corresponding behavioral and attitudinal cultural norms. However, monocultural individuals
may be less likely to recognize dominant cultural perceptions and beliefs as norms that may
differ from other cultural groups (Gutierrez & Sameroff, 1990).

Biculturalism and Cognitive Complexity

85

A second functional explanation for biculturals’ more complex cultural representations
may rest in the particular type of cognitive processes involved in CFS. Work by Meyer and
Kieras (1997) and Rubinstein and colleagues (Rubinstein et al., 2001) shows that when multiple
action schemas are activated (e.g., as when performing multiple tasks simultaneously or
consecutively), individuals use a “supervisory attention system” that monitors which schema
should be used and when, and as such engage in more deliberate and effortful cognitive
processing of the cues that trigger or signal the appropriate action. The alternation between
different cultural schemas and behavioral repertoires involved in the CFS process (e.g.,
switching between different languages and social scripts when interacting with ethnic vs. Anglo
friends) may involve similar executive control processes or supervisory attention system, as
well as more deliberate and effortful processing of the cultural cues associated to each action
schema (Rubinstein et al., 2001). This more systematic and careful processing of cultural cues
may in turn lead to the development of cultural schemas that are more complex (e.g., richer in
content, more differentiated and integrated).
CFS and Cognitive Complexity: Accessibility of Self-Relevant Information. Cultural knowledge
may be more accessible to biculturals than monoculturals because cultural knowledge is likely
an important part of biculturals’ self-concepts. For biculturals, cultural information is highly
self-relevant, and thus, like other types of self-knowledge (e.g., personality traits), highly
accessible to memory (Nowak et al., 2000). Several aspects of the acculturation experience
suggest that cultural knowledge may be highly central to biculturals’ self-definitions. Many
biculturals are immigrants who have spent considerable effort in understanding their new, host
culture, and how to best adapt to it. These experiences may have become an important element
of biculturals’ biographical memories. Furthermore, many biculturals are perceived by others as
different and distinct (due to their accent, skin color, or behavior) and this “token” status has
been shown to be an important dimension of selfhood and identity (Sekaquaptewa &
Thompson, 2003). Cultural information is thus more likely to be an important part of
biculturals’ self-concept, and like other types of self knowledge, be more accessible in memory
and more richly elaborated (Nowak et al., 2000).
Cognitive Consequences of Biculturalism: Domain-General or Domain-Specific? While we
posit that biculturals would have more complex cultural representations than monoculturals, we
do not expect this trend to be evident in culturally-neutral domains. A few linguistic and
developmental studies on biculturalism and bilingualism have reported cognitive advantages for
these groups beyond the cultural and linguistic domains. For example, some studies have found
biculturals to have relatively more complex parental reasoning about child development
(Gutierrez & Sameroff, 1990), increased creativity (Carringer, 1974), and greater attentional
control (Bialystock, 1999). We propose, however, that the higher levels of cognitive complexity
shown by biculturals will be specific to representations and reasoning within the cultural
domain. We base this argument on the socio-cognitive literature on expertise, where cognitive
complexity is seen as a function of experience and involvement with the objects in a particular
phenomenal domain (Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1987). Indeed, our three arguments for linking
biculturals’ CFS to cognitive complexity of cultural representations –namely, experience in
dealing with cultural information, executive cognitive processing involved in cultural frame
switching and self relevance of cultural knowledge– are processes limited to the processing
cultural schemas and cultural cues. In other domains without explicit cultural references –such
as nature or technology– there is no reason to think that biculturals would show higher
expertise, controlled processing, or self relevance. Accordingly, biculturals’ reasoning about
their cultures should be cognitively more complex than monoculturals, but this may not
necessarily be evident in culturally-neutral domains.
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In conclusion, there are reasons to expect biculturals to have relatively more complex
cultural representations than monoculturals, and that the same trend would not be evident in
culturally-neutral representations (Hypothesis 1). These predictions are tested in Study 1.
STUDY 1
In this study, bicultural and monocultural individuals wrote statements about American
culture, Chinese culture, or landscapes. These statements were then content coded for cognitive
complexity. We hypothesize that compared to descriptions of landscapes, biculturals will write
relatively more complex descriptions of the two cultures than monoculturals.
Method
Participants
Our sample included 179 participants (88 males, 91 females; mean age = 20.7) from a
large public university on the West Coast of the United States. Participants were recruited
through campus fliers and were paid for their participation. Of the participants, 79 were selfidentified monocultural Anglo-Americans and 100 were self-identified first-generation ChineseAmerican biculturals. All the Chinese-American participants were born in a Chinese country
(People’s Republic of China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macao, or Singapore), and have lived at
least 5 years in both a Chinese country (Mn = 11.7; SD = 5.6) and the United States (Mn = 8.7;
SD = 4.4). On a 1 to 6 scale where 6 indicated ‘very strongly identified,’ Chinese-American
participants’ identification with Chinese and American cultures were 4.7 (SD = 1) and 3.7 (1.2)
respectively. On a scale of 1 to 5 where 5 indicated ‘perfectly fluent,’ Chinese-American
participants’ self-reported fluency in Chinese and English languages were 3.9 (SD = 1) and 4.4
(.7). These means were all above the scale median, suggesting that our Chinese-American
subsample is indeed bicultural and bilingual. All the Anglo-American participants were born in
the U.S., had lived in the U.S. all their lives, were Caucasian, and identified with AngloAmerican culture (Mn = 4.6; SD = 1.2).
Procedure
Study’s instructions and instruments were in English. Participants were randomly
assigned to one of three experimental conditions: American, Chinese, or landscape. Participants
were told: Please write ten statements to describe American culture/Chinese culture/Natural
landscapes. Before you start, we will show you some pictures strongly associated with this task.
These pictures may give you some ideas but you don’t need to use, describe or even mention
these pictures in your statements (See Benet-Martínez, Lee, & Leu, 2006; for more detailed
information about the pictures and instructions). This method has been previously established as
successful in facilitating participants’ accessibility to their cultural schemas, whose complexity
is the target variable in the present studies. Additionally, by showing the pictures, we were able
to explore the degree to which participants’ cultural descriptions focused on the obvious and
‘easy’ (i.e., writing statements mainly around the meaning conveyed by pictures; low
complexity) vs. abstract and not obvious qualities of the cultures the pictures represent (high
complexity).
After seeing the pictures, participants were given 10 minutes to write their descriptions
(see Appendix A in Benet-Martínez, Lee, & Leu, 2006; for examples of statements written in
each experimental condition). Afterwards, participants completed a demographic questionnaire
that included questions about sex, age, country of birth, years lived in the US and in a Chinese
country, English and Chinese proficiency and usage, and cultural identification.
Coding of Responses: Cognitive Complexity
We used a coding scheme tailored for shorter text while measuring the key dimensions
of cognitive complexity: differentiation, abstractness, articulation, and integration (Burleson &
Caplan, 1998; Lee & Peterson, 1997). Two coders, one Anglo-American and one ChineseAmerican, independently rated each of the ten statements (i.e., descriptions) written by each

Biculturalism and Cognitive Complexity

87

participant on each of the following theory-driven complexity dimensions (inter-rater reliability
is included in parentheses): 1) whether the statement contained multiple perspectives (.93),
2) whether the statement made comparisons between different objects or viewpoints (.85),
3) whether the statement contrasted objects or viewpoints (.70), 4) whether the statement was
evaluative (.87), 5) whether the statement referred to something abstract (vs. concrete) (.77),
6) whether the statement mentioned only implicitly or not at all any of the pictures shown in
each condition (.99), 7) the overall complexity of the ideas or concepts contained in the
statement (.81), 8) whether the statement referred to time (.83), 9) the number of words
contained in each statement (.98), and 10) the number of distinct ideas (.77). These ratings were
done using a scale that ranged from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much so). The two coders were
blind to our hypothesis. Coders were trained together, and conducted their ratings
independently. Given that the coders were generally reliable, the ratings from the two coders
were averaged.
Results
Across experimental conditions, and for each participant, we averaged the ratings
obtained on each the ten cognitive complexity variables described above across the ten
statements each participant wrote. These average cognitive complexity scores were submitted to
a principal components analysis with orthogonal rotation (varimax). The goal of this analysis
was to identify the underlying structure of the complexity ratings (across the three experimental
conditions). An examination of the scree plot and different factor solutions indicated that a
structure with three factors was the most plausible. The first factor, which we called density,
taped the number of words and distinct ideas contained in the statements, whether the
statements mentioned time-related or dynamic trends, and the overall complexity of the
statements (this factor explained 32% of the variance). The second factor, called abstractness,
captured the evaluativeness and abstractness of the statements, and the absence of explicit
references to the pictures (22%). The third factor, named differentiation/integration, taped
whether the statements included multiple perspectives, and whether the statements compared
and contrasted ideas (20%).1 Using these results from the principal components analysis, we
created three composite measures of cognitive complexity (Cronbach’s α indices are given in
parenthesis): density (.90), differentiation/integration (.79), and abstractness (.81).
Hypothesis Testing: 2 by 3 between-subjects analyses of variance were conducted with
experimental condition (American, Chinese, Landscape) and cultural identity (bicultural,
monocultural) as independent variables, and density, differentiation/integration, and
abstractness as dependent variables. As found in previous cognitive complexity studies
(Burleson & Caplan, 1998), the inter-correlations between the composite variables were low (r
indices < .30); thus, separate analyses were conducted for each of the dependent variables
(univariate approach). The analysis of variance results are summarized in Table 1.
Using density as the dependent variable, there was no main effect of cultural identity, as
expected. There was a marginally significant main effect for the experimental condition and
examination of the means showed that Chinese (3.89) and American (3.94) culture descriptions
were more dense than landscape descriptions (3.54); to test for this effect we employed a
contrast and this reached statistical significance. The interaction of cultural identity by
experimental condition was also significant: Compared to the landscape condition (3.71),
biculturals’ descriptions of Chinese and American cultures (4) were relatively higher in density
than monoculturals’ descriptions, supporting Hypothesis 1. A contrast to test this effect was
found statistically significant. Similar results emerged when we examined abstractness as the
dependent variable. There was no main effect for cultural identity. The main effect of the
experimental condition was significant and examination of the means showed that Chinese
(2.79) and American (3.02) culture descriptions were more abstract than landscape descriptions
(1.33); to test for this effect we employed a contrast which was found statistically significant.
The interaction of cultural identity by condition was also found significant: Compared to
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descriptions of landscapes (1.21), biculturals’ descriptions of Chinese and American cultures
(2.94) were relatively more abstract than those provided by monoculturals, supporting
Hypothesis 1. A contrast to test this effect was also significant. Using differentiation/integration
as the dependent variable, the main effect of the experimental condition was not significant. We
found a significant main effect for cultural identity though, with biculturals’ descriptions being
more differentiated (1.36) than monoculturals’ (1.22). The expected interaction of condition by
cultural identity was not found statistically significant.
Table 1. Study 1: Analysis of variance results
DV - Effect
F (df1, df2)
p
η2
DV: DENSITY
Exper. Cond
2.47 (2, 177)
.08
.03
Cultural Id.
NS
Interaction
8.57 (2, 177)
<.001 .09
DV: ABSTRACTNESS
Exper. Cond
182.24 (2,177) <.001 .67
Cultural Id.
NS
Interaction
3.00 (2, 177)
.05
.03
DV: DIFFERENTIATION/INTEGRATION
Exper. Cond
NS
Cultural Id.
4.09 (1, 177)
.05
.02
Interaction
NS

Contrasts
a

F (1, 177) = 4.88, p<.05, η2=.03

b

F (1, 177) = 8.76, p<.01, η2=.04

a

F (1, 177) = 358.74, p<.001, η2=.67

b

F (1, 177) = 3.66, p = .057, η2=.02
—

Key for Contrasts
a
Chinese and American vs. Landscape
b
The following weights were applied for this contrast: Chinese monocultural –1 , Chinese bicultural +1;
American monocultural –1, American bicultural +1; Landscape monocultural +2, Landscape bicultural –2.

Discussion
Study 1 found partial evidence for our hypothesis that Chinese-American biculturals’
representations of culture (Chinese or American) would be cognitively more complex than
those of monoculturals. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, compared to culturally-neutral
descriptions, biculturals’ descriptions of cultural representations were higher in density and
abstractness than monoculturals. However, hypothesis 1 was not confirmed with the cognitive
complexity component of differentiation/integration. One possible reason may be the low level
of variance in this variable. Despite the mixed findings, the present results are noteworthy for
several reasons. First, this study provides the first quantitative evidence that bicultural
individuals have more complex cultural representations than monoculturals. This finding
supports our argument that biculturals, because of their repeated CFS experiences (e.g.,
expertise in detecting, processing, and reacting to cultural cues in the environment) and the selfrelevance of cultural information, think about culture in more complex ways. Second, the
results support our argument that this effect is domain-specific –the higher levels of cognitive
complexity in biculturals compared to monoculturals are largely specific to the cultural domain.
CFS and Cognitive Complexity: Role of BII?
While Study 1 focused on differences between biculturals and monoculturals, recent
research suggests that not all biculturals negotiate and organize their multiple cultural identities
or cultural meaning systems in the same way (Benet-Martínez & Haritatos, 2005; BenetMartínez et al., 2002). Specifically, biculturals can differ in their level of Bicultural Identity
Integration (BII), or the extent to which they perceive their cultural identities as largely
integrated and compatible (high BII) or dissociated and difficult to integrate (low BII). High
and low BIIs tend to experience different levels of acculturation experiences and stresses, and
react to cultural cues in the environment in different ways (Benet-Martínez & Haritatos, 2005).
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Specifically, although biculturals with low BII are also sensitive to cultural cues, they often
respond to them in culturally-incongruent ways; for instance, they provide external attributions
after seeing American cues and internal attributions after seeing Chinese cues (Benet-Martínez
et al., 2002).
A review of the socio-cognitive literature suggests that perceptions of conflict, a
characteristic of low BIIs, may be related to increased cognitive complexity. For instance, a
classic study by Tripodi and Bieri (1966) found that individuals who projected more conflictual
themes in stories about imaginary persons scored higher in cognitive complexity. Menasco
(1976) also reported an association between decisional conflict and cognitive complexity.
Suedfeld and his colleagues (Suedfeld & Wallbaum, 1992; Suedfeld, Bluck, Loewen, & Elkins,
1994) showed that conflict between desired but contradictory values (e.g., individual freedom
and social equality) lead to more complex descriptions of each value. Similarly, Tetlock,
Peterson, and Lerner (1996) found a positive relationship between conflict of core values and
cognitive complexity. According to these studies, we may also find that biculturals who
perceive their two cultural orientations as somewhat conflicting and incompatible (low BIIs)
think in cognitively more complex ways about their cultures than those who perceive their two
cultural orientations as compatible (high BIIs).
In conclusion, we expect more complex cultural representations among biculturals with
low levels of BII (vs. high BIIs). Given that BII is an identity construct specific to the cultural
domain, we further expect this effect to be evident only for cultural representations, but
negligible in non-cultural domains. These predictions are tested in Study 2.
STUDY 2
The procedure of Study 2 is similar to Study 1, except we only used a bicultural sample,
and we measured individual differences in BII. We predict that biculturals with low BII will
write more complex descriptions of their cultures than biculturals high on BII, and that these
differences will not be apparent for descriptions of culturally-neutral objects or entities
(Hypothesis 2).
Method
Participants
Our sample included 261 Chinese-American biculturals (126 males, 135 females; mean
age = 21.6) drawn from a large public university in the Midwest of the United States. As in
Study 1, all participants were born in a Chinese country (People’s Republic of China, Taiwan,
Hong Kong, Macao, or Singapore) and had lived at least 5 years in both a Chinese country (Mn
= 11.5; SD = .6) and the United States (Mn = 8.4; SD = .4). Some participants were recruited
through campus fliers, and were paid for their participation; the rest were recruited through the
Introductory Psychology subject pool and received partial credit for their participation. Using
cultural identification and language ability scales similar to Study 1, participants mean levels of
identification with Chinese and American cultures were 4.6 (SD = .9) and 4.1 (SD = 1.1)
respectively; self-reported levels of fluency in Chinese and English languages were 3.6 (SD =
.7) and 3.7 (SD = .7) respectively. These descriptive means suggest that this sample was overall
clearly bicultural and bilingual.
Procedure
The procedure was similar to Study 1: Before writing the ten statements on American
culture, Chinese culture, or natural landscapes, participants were given the same instructions
and shown the same pictures in each condition as in Study 1. After writing the ten descriptions,
participants completed the Bicultural Identity Integration Scale-Preliminary (BIIS-P; BenetMartínez et al., 2002). This instrument assesses perceived opposition between Chinese and
American cultural identities in a multi-statement vignette that reads as follows: I am a
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bicultural who keeps American and Chinese cultures separate and feels conflicted about these
two cultures. I am mostly just a Chinese who lives in America (vs. a Chinese-American), and I
feel as someone who is caught between two cultures. Using a scale that ranged from 1
(‘definitely not true’) to 5 (‘definitely true’), participants rated how well the above paragraph
described their own experiences as a Chinese-American. Participants also completed Berry et
al.’s (1989) 20-item measure of the four acculturation strategies: assimilation, integration (or
biculturalism), separation, and marginalization. Each item was rated with a scale that ranged
from 1 (‘strongly disagree’) to 5 (‘strongly agree’). Similar to Study 1, we collected
demographic information regarding sex, age, country of birth, years lived in the United States
and in a Chinese country, English and Chinese language proficiency and usage, and cultural
identification.
Cognitive Complexity Coding
The statements-on American culture, Chinese culture and natural landscapes written by
the participants in each condition were coded using the same categories and rating method as
Study 1 (inter-rater reliabilities were high and ranged from .79 to .99). Ratings from the two
coders were averaged given the reliability across all variables. Similar to Study 1, ratings were
further collapsed across the ten statements. Principal component analysis of these ratings
(across the three experimental conditions) with Varimax rotation yielded a 3-dimensional
structure similar to the one found in Study 1. Cognitive complexity composites identical to the
ones created in Study 1 were then computed (Cronbach’s α indices are given in parenthesis):
density (.89), differentiation/integration (.91), and abstractness (.79).
Results
Participants were classified into high BII (N = 148) or low BII (N = 113) groups by
performing a median-split on the BIIS-P ratings. This method, which arguably has some
statistical limitations, has reliably distinguished between different levels of BII in previous
work (e.g., Benet-Martínez et al., 2002; Cheng, Lee, & Benet-Martínez, 2006).2
Hypothesis Testing: 2 by 3 analyses of variance were conducted with experimental
condition (American, Chinese, landscape) and BII (high, low) as independent variables, and
density, differentiation/integration, and abstractness as dependent variables. Like Study 1,
separate analyses were conducted for each of the dependent variables. The analysis of variance
results are summarized in Table 2 below.3
Table 2. Study 2: Analysis of variance results
DV - Effect
F (df1, df2)
p
η2
DV: DENSITY
Exper. Cond
3.07 (2, 260)
<.05
.02
BII.
NS
Interaction
3.89 (2, 260)
<.05
.03
DV: ABSTRACTNESS
Exper. Cond
29.30 (2,260)
<.001 .18
BII.
NS
Interaction
4.55 (2, 260)
<.01
.03
DV: DIFFERENTIATION/INTEGRATION
Exper. Cond
NS
BII.
2.89 (1, 260)
<.10
.01
Interaction
3.25 (2, 260)
<.05
.03

Contrasts
a

F (1, 260) = 5.47, p<.05, η2=.02

b

F (1, 260) = 13.61, p<.001, η2=.05

a

F (1, 260) = 54.46, p<.001, η2=.18

b

F (1, 260) = 6.90, p <.01, η2=.03

b

—
F (1, 260) = 2.41, p = .12, η2=.01

Key for Contrasts
a
Chinese and American vs. Landscape
b
The following weights were applied for this contrast: Chinese high BII –1 , Chinese low BII +1; American
high BII –1, American low BII +1; Landscape high BII +2, Landscape low BII –2.
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Using density as the dependent variable, there was no main effect of BII, as expected.
There was significant main effect of condition: An examination of the means revealed that
Chinese (4.20) and American (3.84) culture descriptions were more dense than landscape
descriptions (3.13); a post-hoc contrast to test this effect was significant. The BII by condition
interaction was significant: As the means revealed, compared to the landscape descriptions
(3.12), low BII’s descriptions of Chinese and American cultures (4.22) were relatively higher in
density than those written by high BIIs, supporting Hypothesis 2. A contrast to test this effect
was significant. Similar results were obtained with abstractness as the dependent variable.
There was no main effect for BII. The main effect of condition was significant; Chinese (2.54)
and American (2.79) culture descriptions were more abstract than landscape descriptions (1.88);
a post-hoc contrast to test this effect was significant. The BII by condition interaction was
significant, in support of Hypothesis 2: compared to the landscape descriptions (1.87), low BII’s
descriptions of Chinese and American cultures (2.79) were relatively more abstract than those
written by high BIIs. A contrast to test this effect was significant. Using differentiation/
integration as the dependent variable, we found a marginally significant main effect for BII,
with low BIIs using more differentiation/integration (1.32) than high BIIs (1.26). The condition
main effect was not significant. Again, the condition by BII interaction was significant:
Compared to the landscape descriptions (1.25), low BII’s descriptions of Chinese and American
cultures (1.43) were relatively higher in differentiation/integration than those written by high
BIIs, supporting Hypothesis 2 (see respective main effect and contrast testing in Table 2).
Overall, we found support for Hypothesis 2 on all three components of cognitive complexity.
General Discussion
The increasing prevalence of bicultural and multicultural individuals in our society today
calls for a better understanding of how these individuals’ repeated processing and managing of
information from different cultures may impact their cognitive and social behavior (Hermans &
Kempen, 1998; Hong et al., 2000). The present work attempts to address this issue by
comparing biculturals and monoculturals’ levels of cognitive complexity.
Complexity of Cultural Representations: Comparing Biculturals and Monoculturals
We first examined how cultural frame-switching (CFS) may affect the ways in which
bicultural individuals think and reason about their cultures. Specifically, we compared the
complexity of “cultural representations” (Hall, 1997) –the particular values, practices, images,
and artifacts associated to a specific culture– of Chinese-American biculturals and AngloAmerican monoculturals (Study 1). Relying on evidence from the socio-cognitive literature on
cognitive complexity (e.g., Suedfeld et al., 1992), expertise (e.g., Feltovich et al., 1997), multitasking (e.g., Rubinstein et al., 2001), and self-schematicity (Nowak et al., 2000), we
hypothesized that, compared to monoculturals, biculturals would have more complex ethnic and
mainstream cultural representations because of: (1) their repeated experience in detecting,
processing, and reacting to cultural cues in the environment (i.e., CFS, Hong et al., 2000),
(2) the executive cognitive processing involved in cultural schema switching, and (3) the unique
relevance to the self that cultural knowledge has for them. Furthermore, following arguments
from the literature linking social cognition and expertise (e.g., Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1987), we
predicted that these differences would be not apparent for non-cultural representations (e.g.,
reasoning about nature).
Results from this first study partially confirmed our predicted interaction effect:
Chinese-American biculturals’ free descriptions of (American or Chinese) cultures were higher
in density and abstractness (two components of our cognitive complexity measure) than AngloAmerican monoculturals’ descriptions, but the same effect was not found with descriptions of
culturally-neutral entities (landscapes). Our predicted interaction effect was not found for the
cognitive complexity component of integration/differentiation (although biculturals scored
higher on this variable than monoculturals). Overall, our findings provided initial support for
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the idea that biculturals think about both their ethnic (e.g., Chinese, Mexican) and mainstream
(e.g., American) cultures in more complex ways.
What are the implications of Study 1 findings? First, the fact that biculturals describe
ethnic cultures in more complex ways than monoculturals is hardly surprising given biculturals’
unique exposure to and familiarity with their second culture. However, our finding that
biculturals have also more complex (i.e., higher in abstractness and word density)
representations of mainstream culture than monoculturals contradicts the common notion that
deep, complex understanding of a culture is higher among traditional, monocultural, majority
members of that culture (vs. minority groups or immigrants with less exposure to that culture).
This finding suggests that immigrants and ethnic minorities who have internalized the host
culture in addition to their ethnic culture may have a unique grasp on the complexities and
nuances of the main, dominant culture that surrounds them despite their minority status. In other
words, our work suggests the possibility that CFS –or the experience of navigating between two
cultures and being forced to reason about their differences, similarities, and abstract qualities–
more than traditional cultural membership per se, may be critical in the development of
complex and multidimensional cultural representations.
Second, our findings suggest that the ability to think about one’s culture(s) in complex
ways can perhaps be learned or facilitated. We proposed that biculturals acquire more complex
cultural representations largely through the experience of CFS; in a similar vein, daily
immersion into a multicultural environment (e.g., being married to a person with a different
cultural background, extensive traveling) may help monocultural individuals develop a more
complex understanding of their own culture. If this were true, one may think then that
multicultural policies should be encouraged, not only because of society’s obligation to
understand and support cultural minorities, but also because cultural majorities may gain greater
insight and understanding of their own cultural make-up.
The above ideas, although promising, should be taken with caution given some of the
design limitations of our study. For instance, future work should test the generalizability of our
findings to different samples of biculturals (e.g., non-Asian, U.S.-born, and older individuals),
monoculturals (e.g., monocultural Chinese), and in different national territories (e.g., Canada,
Europe, etc.). Furthermore, further studies are needed to examine if biculturals’ higher cultural
complexity applies only to their two internalized cultures (i.e., ethnic and mainstream) or to all
cultural descriptions in general. Another possible line of future work is to examine how the
cognitive consequences of biculturalism may also bring benefits in the social domain (Abe &
Weisman, 1983; LaFromboise et al., 1993; Van der Zee & Van Oudenhoven, 2001).
Specifically, does biculturalism increase individuals’ level of multicultural sensitivity, a
collection of psychological traits also described as cultural competence or cultural
effectiveness? Specifically, one may argue that biculturals’ more complex mainstream and
ethnic cultural representations could relate to higher levels of cultural empathy (ability to detect
and understand other’s cultural habits or pressures) and cultural flexibility (ability to quickly
switch from one cultural strategy or framework to another). Relatedly, future research should
examine if biculturalism facilitates the inhibition of cultural epistemic needs such as
stereotyping and prejudice (Van der Zee & Van der Gang, 2005). Lastly, it is possible that the
effects reported for the bicultural vs. monocultural groups and for the cultural vs. neutral
conditions may have been tempered by two features of our design: the fact that the study was
conducted in English across the three conditions and that the control condition required
participants to describe landscapes as if they were in a “geography” class (two contexts
typically associated with Anglo-American culture and college settings).
Complexity of Cultural Representations: Role of Bicultural Identity Integration (BII)
Recent work by Benet-Martínez and her colleagues (Benet-Martínez & Haritatos, 2005;
Benet-Martínez et al., 2002) has shown systematic differences among biculturals in their level
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of Bicultural Identity Integration (BII), or the extent to which they perceive their cultural
identities as largely integrated and compatible (high BII) or conflictual and dissociated (low
BII). Given the social and cognitive literature linking psychological conflict and cognitive
complexity (e.g., Suedfeld & Wallbaum, 1992; Tetlock et al., 1996; Tripodi & Bieri, 1966), our
second study explored differences between high and low BIIs in the complexity of their cultural
representations. We reasoned that the more systematic and careful processing of cues that
underlies the monitoring of conflictual information would lead low BIIs to develop cultural
representations that are more complex (e.g., richer in content, more differentiated and
integrated) than high BIIs. Like in Study 1, we predicted that this effect would not be apparent
in culturally-neutral representations. Results from this second study supported our predictions:
Descriptions of Chinese and American cultures written by low BIIs were higher in density,
abstractness, and differentiation/integration than high BIIs’ descriptions, and this effect was not
found with descriptions of landscapes.
Low BIIs’ higher complexity in cultural representations could be explained by several
mechanisms. First, it is possible that this trend is driven by low BIIs’ negative moods in cultural
domains. That is, our cultural description task might have reminded low BIIs of their conflictual
cultural orientation and the emotional uneasiness associated with their bicultural experiences
(e.g., feelings of being torn between two very different cultural orientations). These negative
feelings, in turn, may make low BIIs more analytical and critical in their cultural descriptions,
resulting in higher complexity (Suedfeld & Pennebaker, 1994; Tripodi & Bieri, 1967).
Furthermore, low BIIs’ uneasiness about possible competing cultural norms might make them
more “vigilant” in cultural domains, which could lead to higher cognitive complexity. In other
words, it may be adaptive for low BIIs to pay extra attention to cultural cues to avoid behaving
in culturally inappropriate ways; this attention in turn may bring about higher complexity.
What are the real-world implications for low BII’s more complex cultural
representations? At face value, our findings seem to suggest that low BIIs, despite their inner
cultural conflict, may be better equipped at handling the demands of ambiguous, complex, and
fast-changing cultural situations because they use more complex reasoning in cultural domains.
In other words, perhaps low BIIs are more culturally competent. This, however, contradicts
some past results; Benet-Martínez and her colleagues found that low BIIs largely respond to
cultural cues in culturally incongruent ways; that is, they behave in a prototypically ethnic way
when faced with Anglo-American cues and in a prototypical American way when exposed to
ethnic cues (Benet-Martínez, et al, 2002). In short, there is evidence suggesting that low BIIs
display a behavioral “reactance” against the cultural expectations embedded in the particular
situation. These various results suggest that, although perceived cultural conflict in biculturals
predicts more complex cultural representations, it also predicts cultural reactance that may be
maladaptive. Future work is needed to examine more closely how BII relates to day-to-day
cultural competence and well-being.
Conclusion
When an individual participates simultaneously in two different cultures and these
cultural worlds are to a large extent disjunctive, this individual may be confronted with
uncertainties, contradictions, ambiguities, and contrasting interests. The present work provides
preliminary evidence for the idea that biculturals’ meeting of such cultural contact zones leads
to the development of more complex and integrative cultural representations. Our work
suggests that this is especially true for biculturals who perceive their cultural identities as
conflicting (low BIIs). Beyond the cognitive and social processes underlying biculturalism, we
hope that the present work is also relevant to the understanding of multiculturalism at the
societal level. Perhaps cultural plurality at the individual (bicultural identity) and collective
level (multiculturalism) can lead to cultural knowledge that goes “beyond the respectful
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acknowledgement of differences to a fusion of horizons in which we both learn from others and
are grounded afresh in our own best values” (Fowers & Richardson, 1996; p. 620).
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Endnotes
See Table 1 in Benet-Martínez, Lee, and Leu (2006) for further information about this factor solution, and
Table 2 for the means and standard deviations for each cognitive complexity dimension on each experimental
condition and cultural identity group.
2
See Table 3 in Benet-Martínez et al. (2006) for more information about the demographic and acculturation
status of these two groups (e.g., endorsement of Berry’s integration strategy by both groups).
3
See Table 4 in Benet-Martínez, Lee, and Leu (2006) for the means and standard deviations for each
cognitive complexity dimension on each experimental condition and BII level group.
1
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